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ABSTRACT 
Northern Ireland has seen a rise in racially motivated crimes and incidents reported to 
police in recent years and, although this has been accompanied by intensiﬁed media 
coverage, this phenomenon has been the subject of relatively little research. The purpose 
of this study is to evaluate empirically three theories that have been proposed to explain 
prejudice towards ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland; economic self- interest, social 
contact, and ‘sectarianism as racism’. Using the 2013 Northern Ireland Life and Times  
Survey,  which  contains  new  questions on contact with ethnic minorities, this study looks 
at attitudes towards Eastern Europeans, Muslims and a third  category  of  ‘other  ethnic  
groups’. Results from multivariate linear regression provide evidence for all three theories 
but also show that the strength and signiﬁcance of predictive variables for prejudice vary 
across the minority groups. The ﬁndings that there are different motivations for prejudice 
towards different groups can inform policies to tackle racism in Northern Ireland. 
 
Introduction 
Northern Ireland has traditionally been perceived in terms of the binary division between 
Protestants and Roman Catholics, who comprise 48% and 45% of the population, 
respectively.1 This divide has deﬁned many aspects of lives Northern Irish residents, 
including which school they send their children to, where they live and who they marry 
(Nic Craith 2002; McVeigh and Rolston 2007). Over recent decades, however, this 
division has become less salient as sectarian violence has subsided. Yet, since the 1990s, 
racially motivated crimes and racism directed against people from ethnic minorities have 
increased (McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Wallace, McAreavey, and Atkin 2013). This is 
apparent in the growing volume of media accounts of attacks against ethnic and religious 
minorities, ranging from routine harassment to extreme acts of violence, with Northern 
Ireland now described as the ‘race hate capital of Europe’ (NICEM 2013, 1). However, 
there has been relatively little quantitative research on racial prejudice among the 
majority white Irish community. This is unfortunate as, beyond the need for such 
research to inform policy, Northern Ireland is of interest because it has only experienced 
signiﬁcant immigration relatively recently and because much of the migration has been 
from the post-2004 European Union (EU) member states in Central and Eastern Europe. 
 
This paper begins by reviewing experiences of and responses to racism in Northern 
Ireland. Then it describes key characteristics of the ethnic minority population in 
Northern Ireland, reviews existing literature on attitudes to ethnic minorities there and 
the theories that have been proposed to explain prejudice, and then analyses the 
determinants of racial prejudice among the non-ethnic minority population using recent 
survey data. 
 
Racism and the response in Northern Ireland 
Northern Ireland has, until relatively recently, been ethnically homogenous. 
Geographical isolation and lack of employment opportunities excluded it from the post-
war Commonwealth migration to Great Britain. Other than the small, long-established 
Jewish community, most migrants were Hong Kong Chinese, with a few doctors from the 
Indian sub-continent (Russell 2012, 89). The promise of peace after the Good Friday 
Agreement created better working conditions and this, coupled with EU expansion, 
brought a new wave of economic migrants into the region. Many were from Eastern 
Europe and initially they settled mainly in deprived, predominantly loyalist areas of 
Northern Ireland (McVeigh and Rolston 2007). 
Northern Ireland’s still limited experience of immigration is reﬂected in its weak political 
response. The Race Relations Order was enacted only in 1997, 21 years after equivalent 
legislation in Great Britain and, although modelled on it, is perceived to be weaker and 
less strongly enforced (Northern Ireland Council for Ethnic Minorities) (McCaffery 2013). 
The Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive have shown little interest; a search for 
written questions containing the index term ‘race relations’ in the Hansard record for 
the Northern Ireland Assembly found only 109 written questions since its establishment 
in 1998 (accessed 12 October 2014). 
Although only a partial reﬂection of racist behaviour, statistics from the Police Service of 
Northern Ireland (2014) show increasing reports of racially motivated incidents and 
crimes, reversing a sustained fall in the decade to 2010 (Figure 1). The number of racist 
incidents reported in 2013/ 2014 was 30.9% higher than in the previous year, while 
reported sectarian incidents had fallen by 6.4% in the same period. These racially 
motivated incidents were predominantly concentrated in the capital, Belfast; similar 
trends are seen for those racially motivated incidents meeting the criteria to be 
considered criminal. 
 
The ethnic minority population in Northern Ireland 
Estimating the size of the ethnic minority population is complex, requiring triangulation 
of data from several sources. The census reports self-reported ethnicity and country of 
Figure 1. Trends in racist motivated incidents and crimes. 
Source: PSNI annual crime statistics, http://www.psni.police.uk/quarterly_hate_motivations_bulletin_apr-jun_14_15.pdf. 
 
birth. The ﬁrst misses growing numbers of Eastern Europeans, categorised as white. The 
second excludes people who self- identify as ethnic minorities but are second- or third-
generation migrants. 
Using the question on self-reported ethnicity in the 2011 Northern Ireland Census (NISRA 
(Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency)) residents belonging to an ethnic 
minority group amounted to 32,400 or 1.8% of the overall population. This more than 
doubled since the  
2001 Census (0.8%) although the rise was less than some predicted (Gallagher 2007). 
During this period, Northern Ireland’s population grew by 7.5%, with ethnic minorities 
accounting for about    a sixth of this increase. The three main groups within the ethnic 
minority population were; Chinese, Indian, Other Asian (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Frequency of main (non-white) ethnic minority groups in Northern Ireland. 
Source: Northern Ireland Census 2001/2011. Note: Other Asian = Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Other Asian; Other = Mixed and 
Other. 
 
As noted above, this question does not capture the rapidly growing population from the 
10 Eastern European countries that have joined the EU since 2004, the ﬁrst eight of which 
are known as the A8 countries. The large gap in living standards between the A8 and the 
15 pre-2004 EU member states made it inevitable that they would be a major source of 
migrant workers within the EU. Their numbers can be ascertained from the census 
question on country of birth. However, it is necessary to use both questions to obtain a 
comprehensive picture. 
Figure 3 reveals that just over 33,000 usual residents of Northern Ireland were born in 
one of the A8 countries or Bulgaria and Romania, just behind those born in the Republic 
of Ireland. 
The Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey, used in this paper asks questions about 
three ethnic/ religious groups; Eastern Europeans, Muslims, and Other. In the Census 
those who self- identiﬁed as Muslim numbered just over 3800 making this group just 
over one tenth the size of   the Eastern European population.2 The ‘other’ ethnic group, 
while not explicitly deﬁned in the survey, can be assumed to comprise mainly Chinese 
and Indians (based on census data). 
 
  
Figure 3. Country of birth excluding Northern Ireland for all usual residents in 2011 
Census. Source: NISRA Census 2011. 
Previous research on racism in Northern Ireland 
The promise of peace in Northern Ireland following the Good Friday Agreement 
prompted many studies of the changing relationships between Protestants and Catholics 
(Cox, Guelke, and Stephen 2000; Paolini et al. 2004; Hewstone et al. 2006). Considerably 
less attention has been paid to changes in relationships between other growing, but still 
minority communities in Northern Ireland and the increasing evidence of prejudice 
against them. Given the previously small numbers of ethnic minorities, it was perhaps 
understandable that they attracted little attention from researchers. As McVeigh 
(1998b, 11) noted, people may perceive that ‘racism is not really a problem here because 
there are no black people here’. However, as growing numbers of people from an 
ethnic minority background are being born and migrating into Northern Ireland, this 
issue can no longer be ignored. Much of the evidence on racial prejudice and 
discrimination in Northern Ireland is found in grey literature, such as reports from 
ofﬁcial and non-governmental agencies (Jarman and Monaghan 2003; Russell 2012; 
NICEM 2013), news media (McDonald 2009; BBC News 2013) and online blogs 
(McCaffery 2013). This provides factual information and context, but not a detailed 
analysis. Gilligan (2008, 1) sums up the state of ethnic and racial studies literature on 
Northern Ireland stating ‘It is either ignored or it is quarantined,’ making the observation 
that some of the most important works almost completely ignore Northern Ireland. 
McVeigh takes a similar view, arguing that   until now the speciﬁcity of Northern Irish 
racism has led researchers to avoid the region. These factors, coupled with the 
dominance of the discourse on sectarianism, have created a ‘mental hurdle’ (Smith 1996, 
94) to study Northern Ireland. 
There are, however, some exceptions. Hainsworth’s (1998) book Divided Society: Ethnic 
Minorities and Racism in Northern Ireland, provides a rich account of experiences of 
ethnic minorities in Northern Ireland, with speciﬁc chapters on Jewish, Pakistani, and 
Indian communities. Furthermore several empirical studies use data from Northern 
Ireland (McVeigh 1992; Hayes and Dowds 2006; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Knox 2010; 
Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and Ireland 2012). Thus, there is no reason why Northern Ireland 
should be quarantined and, in fact, the growing number  of ethnic minorities, coupled 
with new and improved data and increased media coverage of racial attacks allow us to 
address this issue. In the following section I draw on this earlier work to identify different 
theories that have been proposed to explain racism and assess their explanatory power 
in the context of Northern Ireland. 
 
Sectarianism as racism 
Previous literature on Northern Ireland society has focused on sectarianism and speciﬁc 
relationships between Protestants and Catholics. However, several authors have argued 
that sectarianism  in Northern Ireland is not as unique as it is made out to be and is, in 
fact, an extension of racism, here termed the ‘sectarianism as racism’ theory (Brewer 
1992; McVeigh 1998a; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Finlay 2010). Robert McVeigh, one of 
the most proliﬁc writers on racism in Northern Ireland, provides a much needed critique 
of the dominance of sectarianism in the literature, which he considers has led to 
discussion of racism being sidelined (McVeigh 1992, 1998a, 1998b; McVeigh and Rolston 
2007). McVeigh argues that Northern Ireland is seen as distinct and unique within the 
global literature on racism because of the perceived speciﬁcity of sectarianism and goes 
on to argue, as Brewer (1992) did, that sectarianism is a form of racism and the religious 
element has only created unnecessary confusion. Thus, certain characteristics, based on 
religious stereotyping, are attributed rigidly to one part of the population, setting them 
apart from the other. Focusing on sectarianism as unique is unhelpful as it either ignores 
or isolates the problem when in fact ‘people are perfectly capable of being both sectarian 
and racist’ (McVeigh and Rolston 2007, 13). 
To test whether racism will correlate with sectarianism it is necessary to ﬁnd a way of 
capturing sectarianism. This is not straightforward and some imaginative methods have 
been used, although few are appropriate for use in surveys. In surveys it has often been 
measured using the question of whether someone from the Protestant or Catholic faith 
is opposed to having someone marry into their family from the ‘other’ religion (Knox 
2010). Knox’s (2010) study using the NILT data   found that responses to this question 
were a signiﬁcant predictor of racial prejudice, viewed as lending support to the theory 
of a link between sectarianism and racism. 
What is less clear is whether these observed associations are due to sectarianism per se 
or religion. McVeigh and Rolston note selective migration of ethnic minorities to more 
crowded ‘loyalist’ working-class areas, characterised not only by being predominantly 
Protestant but also   by prevalent sectarian attitudes. This has given rise to a perceived 
link between loyalism and racism that is implicitly or explicitly described in media reports. 
Consistent with this view, several studies have found religion to be a determinant of 
prejudice in Northern Ireland (Connolly and Keenan 2000; Gilligan 2008). Knox’s (2010) 
paper, examining racism in Northern Ireland, ﬁnds that Protestants are more likely than 
Catholics to present prejudiced attitudes while Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and Ireland (2012) 
found that Protestants were more prejudiced in relation to all three minority groups they 
looked at, while the biggest difference was in their attitudes towards Muslims. Thus, 
there is evidence to link both religion and sectarian values to prejudice against minority 
groups. 
It is, however, also important to consider whether Protestants and Catholics have 
different degrees of contact with other minorities. The role of social contact is discussed 
in a later section but for now it can be noted that the NILT data show that Catholics do 
have signiﬁcantly more contact with Eastern Europeans (Figure 4), presumably because 
many of the latter are Catholic3 but there is no signiﬁcant difference in the degree of 
contact that Protestants and Catholics have with Muslims4 or other ethnic groups.5 
For these reasons, research on racial prejudice in Northern Ireland should look 
separately at religious identiﬁcation and sectarian attitudes. 
 
Figure 4. Reported contact with ethnic minorities by native Protestants and Catholics. 
 
Economic self-interest 
Economic self-interest theory is based on the idea that minorities, especially migrants, 
pose an economic threat to the existing, majority ethnic group. Taking its cue from group 
threat theory (Quillian 1995), some have linked the rise of prejudice in settings where 
minority groups are especially numerous to competition for jobs and scarce resources, 
narrowing the concept to ‘economic threat’ (Blumer 1958; Blalock 1967; Bonacich 1972; 
Bobo 1983). Thus, prejudice can be an outcome of a threat from the minority group, for 
reasons such as their ability to provide cheaper labour and undercut the higher wages of 
the established majority, known as ‘realistic threats’ (Blalock 1967) as opposed to 
symbolic or perceived threats such as conﬂicts with language and culture. Realistic group 
threat theory helps to explain how competition for these scarce and tangible resources 
can lead to a perception that the interests of the ‘in-group’ are threatened and thus gives 
rise to increased prejudice towards the ‘out-group’. 
According to this theory, the in-group believe that they will be disproportionately 
affected by increasing numbers of ethnic minorities near their home or in their 
workplace and are more likely to be prejudiced towards them. It predicts that negative 
attitudes towards out-groups will be greatest among those strata of the population that 
hold positions similar to immigrant groups, by virtue of their low social class and 
education, and who therefore are most vulnerable to competition (Scheepers, Gijsberts, 
and Coenders 2002). This is also apparent in studies looking at determinants of support 
for extreme right wing parties or strong opposition to immigration (Golder 2003; Ford 
and Goodwin 2010). 
Different measures of economic status have been used to test economic threat theories, 
including household income (reported or perceived), social class, and perceptions of the 
economy. Reported income has intuitive strengths, where available, but is a static 
measure, whereas economic threat may be more closely related to changes in income 
over time, either recalled from the past or anticipated for the future. Hence, perceived 
ﬁnancial situation may be a better measure in this context. 
Although education is not, in itself, a measure of economic threat, many studies have 
shown that low education renders individuals vulnerable to perceived economic threat 
from migrants who may be competing for the same scarce resources, including 
employment (Kluegel and Smith 1983; Citrin et al. 1997), but have the same or higher 
levels of education. This mechanism is borne out by evi- dence that skilled workers are 
more accepting of migrants in those settings where migrants are   less skilled, and less 
so where they are more skilled (Mayda 2006). The effect does seem, however, to be 
somewhat greater among labour market participants, as might be expected (O’Rourke 
and Sinnott 2006) while the evidence is conﬂicting as to whether the effect is different in 
areas with high and low immigration levels (Scheve and Slaughter 2001). In contrast, 
better educated individuals have greater reserves of human capital and thus are more 
resilient to, and less threatened economically by minority groups (van Oorschot 2000; 
Raijman, Semyonov, and Schmidt 2003) and, empirically, have been shown to be more 
tolerant (Hagendoorn and Nekuee 1999); Thus, although not strictly an economic 
variable, from a theoretical perspective education can be considered an appropriate 
indicator of vulnerability to economic threat. As a result, education is frequently included 
in empirical research into racial prejudice. 
Empirically, while it is correlated with income, it is a distinct measure as a number of 
studies ﬁnd that education can explain differences in racial prejudice independent of 
income (Case, Greely, and Fuchs 1989; Wagner and Zick 1995; Carvacho et al. 2013). In 
a review of studies of the role of income, education, employment, and occupational 
class, van Oorschot and Uunk (2007, 65) conclude that ‘education proves to have the 
most consistent and strongest effect’. In summary, economic self-interest theory predicts 
that those, whose economic situation is most precarious, such as those who have less 
education, are unemployed, and with lower incomes would report more prejudiced 
attitudes towards minority groups. 
 
Social contact 
The theory that contact among people with different characteristics will reduce 
prejudice has long underpinned policies to improve relations between communities, 
including integrated residential development and schools. Allport’s (1954) research 
published in ‘The Nature of Prejudice’ is the most inﬂuential. He suggests that contact 
between a minority and majority group can weaken prejudice and stereotypes in 
speciﬁc situational conditions (Pettigrew 1998). According to this, contact with 
members of ethnic minorities under these conditions is predicted to positively affect 
attitudes towards members of those groups. These conditions have been taken to 
mean slightly different things by researchers; some have argued that knowing 
someone from another group who lives in your community is sufﬁcient to confer 
equal status, as those living in the same neighbourhood tend to have similar social 
status (Dixon and Rosenbaum 2004). Importantly, there is some evidence that when the 
conditions are not met there may be negative consequences for relations between 
minority and majority groups (Brooks 1975). However, most of the recent evidence ﬁnds 
positive effects even if the key conditions are not wholly met (Pettigrew 1998). This 
observation has led Pettigrew to decry some current research in which writers are 
becoming bogged down with the theories, confusing ‘facilitating with essential 
conditions’. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006), in a meta-analysis of evidence for intergroup 
contact theory, concluded that contact, under Allport’s conditions, is more effective in 
reducing prejudice, but contact without these conditions also works. This provides 
scope for researchers to analyse contact even when the data do not provide 
information on these conditions. Hayes and Dowds (2006) conducted an extensive 
analysis of attitudes towards immigrants in Northern Ireland. They tested three 
alternative theories which purport to explain attitudes towards minorities; social 
contact, cultural marginality, and economic self-interest. Using the Northern Ireland 
component of the European Social Survey, from 2003, they found that social exposure 
and cultural marginality were both independently able to predict pro-immigration 
attitudes, with prior social contact among the most signiﬁcant drivers. Thus, we might 
predict that social contact with members of ethnic minorities groups would have a 
positive effect on the respondent’s attitudes towards members of the same groups. 
These theories, which draw on previous research, underpin the analyses in this study. 
However, as noted above much of the research has concentrated rather one 
dimensionally on the experience of and attitudes towards minorities in general or has 
examined individual theories. There is a need for further research that recognises the 
diversity of ethnic minorities and the prejudice towards them. For example, some 
explanations for prejudiced attitudes towards Muslims may be different from those 
explaining attitudes towards Eastern Europeans who, because they are white and 
predominantly Catholic, might ﬁnd it easier to ﬁt into certain communities. Of the over 
33,0006 individuals living in Northern Ireland and born in Eastern European (post-2004 
accession), 75%7 describe themselves as Roman Catholic. This highlights the need for 
theories of prejudice to be tested among a range of ethnic and religious minorities, in 
order to recognise the diverse processes by which prejudice arises against different 
groups and thus to inform policies that might address them. Thus, the aim of this study 
is to obtain insights into prejudice towards different minority groups using pre- existing 
theories. The study does not seek to compare formally their explanatory power, given 
the need to work with available variables, some of which are proxies for the different 
theories rather than direct measures of the relevant constructs such as sectarianism or 
perceived economic threat although, in these cases, this is an inevitable limitation given 
the absence of validated survey measures and the scope for problems such as social 
desirability bias. 
 
Measuring prejudice 
In order to analyse prejudice it is necessary to ﬁrst decide on exactly what we are looking 
at. Allport deﬁned prejudice as ‘an antipathy based upon a faulty and inﬂexible 
generalization’ (Allport 1954, 10). A simpler and widely accepted deﬁnition is that 
prejudice is a negative attitude towards a particular social group or person belonging 
to it (Augoustinos and Reynolds 2001, 2; Dovido et al. 2010, 45–46). In this sense, 
prejudice is deﬁned as one or more unjustiﬁed and rigid negative attitudes projected 
upon a group of people sharing similar characteristics. 
With a clear deﬁnition of prejudice, we look to the extensive literature on prejudice in 
survey research to see how we can measure this phenomenon. However, possibly 
because it is so extensive, the literature contains many, sometimes muddled ways of 
measuring this. These are often tied to concepts of ‘stereotypes’ and ‘discrimination’, 
elements of which share similarities but the deﬁnitions used, and their 
operationalisation, vary. 
Since the early survey research on prejudice (Katz and Braly 1933), respondents have 
been asked directly about their attitudes or their perceived prejudices. This direct 
measure of prejudice is now widespread, often in the form ‘are you prejudiced?’. 
However, this approach has been criticised because of arguably obvious limitations in 
that it can only provide a valid estimate of the respondent’s level of prejudice if they are 
willing and able to report it. This can easily be subject to social desirability bias, given 
that it is now deemed unacceptable in many cultures to overtly express prejudice towards 
certain groups in society, although to differing degrees (Schuman, Steeh, and Lawrence 
1997). Additionally, it relies on respondents having the same view of what constitutes 
prejudice and being able to recognise whether their own attitudes are prejudiced. 
Finally, this question does not indicate which ethnic or religious groups the respondents 
are prejudiced against. Given the many assumptions required to interpret direct 
questions on prejudice, responses may be invalid and unreliable and, in particular, may 
underestimate its extent. 
A measure based on the Bogardus Social Distance Scale has been used in more recent 
studies. The respondent is not asked directly if they are prejudiced; instead their level of 
prejudice is calculated from their willingness to engage with someone of a different 
group, thus not relying on the respondent’s introspective analysis of their attitudes. Knox 
(2010) uses the social distance scale but dichotomises the scale of six variables into not 
prejudiced (would accept a minority member into the family) and prejudiced (all other 
categories) to use it in a binary logistic regression. Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and Ireland (2012) 
conducted a more in depth analysis, also using the social distance scale from the NILT 
data. They undertook structural equation modelling and path analysis to identify latent 
factors, to explore differences in racial attitudes from the perspective of Protestants and 
Catholics. This analysis also made use of the fact that the question is asked about three 
different ethnic groups. For the purpose of this study we employ the Social Distance Scale 
to measure prejudice, the details of which are explained in the next section. 
 
Data and methods 
This study uses the 2013 NILT Survey. The aim of the survey is to ‘monitor the attitudes 
and behaviour of people in Northern Ireland annually to provide a time series and public 
record of how our attitudes and behaviour develop on a wide range of policy issues’ (ARK 
2010, 1). The 2013 data comprise 1210 face-to-face interviews with adults aged 18 or 
over and included both an interview and a self-completion questionnaire. The 2013 
survey includes a section on attitudes to minority ethnic people and migrant workers. 
Some of the questions were changed after the 2012 survey, including those on contact 
with ethnic minorities, which are now aligned with the social distance questions. The 
data are weighted for household size. For the purpose of this study only respondents 
who declared themselves not to be from an ethnic minority background were included 
in the analysis. The statistical analysis was performed using Stata version 14. 
 
Dependent variable 
In this study the dependent variable, prejudice, is measured using the social distance 
scale. The scale measures each respondent’s willingness to engage socially with people 
from a group. It is derived from a set of questions on whether the respondent would 
accept someone from each group at different levels of social distance from them, thus 
revealing how accepting they are of each group. Additionally the scale is cumulative 
(meeting the criteria of a Guttman scale) so that if the respondent accepts someone at 
one level they will accept them at all previous levels. The social distance scale has been 
computed so that those who said no at every question (within each group) scored    1 
(least accepting) and respondents who stated yes to every question, accepted someone 
at every level scored 7 (most accepting). Thus (scores in parentheses), if someone 
accepts an Eastern European as a relative by marriage (7) they would also accept them 
as, in increasing order of social distance, a close friend (6), a colleague at work (5), a 
resident in their local area (4), a resident of Northern Ireland (3), and a tourist visiting 
Northern Ireland (2), while those rejecting them in all   of these categories scores 1. 
Scales were computed for all three groups. Although there are some obvious problems 
with the vagueness of the ‘other’ category, this is used primarily as a reference point for 
the other two groups rather than having merit in and of itself. 
Preliminary analysis of the data (see supplementary material) conﬁrmed that the scales 
used in this study, each relating to an ethnic group, conform to the criteria for a 
Guttman Scale. Each of the scales also shows excellent reliability, with Cronbach’s alpha 
values as follows: Eastern European 0.901; Muslim 0.913; and Other 0.847. This scale, as 
Knox (2010, 403) explains, is useful in its simplicity, so that it provides a ‘one-
dimensional assessment of racial attitudes’. Moreover while the nature of these 
relationships, for example, as a tourist, or as a family member are different, it has 
proven an effective measure for analysing prejudice, especially compared with more 
direct measures. Comparing data from the 2013 NILT survey with those from earlier 
waves (Table 1) shows how attitudes towards ethnic minorities have changed between 
2010 and 2013. The scores on the social distance scale show that, for all three groups, 
respondents are increasingly less likely to accept them at all levels. Thus, it would appear 
that prejudice towards all three groups is increasing. As a reminder, acceptance as a 
relative by marriage indicates the least prejudiced that a respondent can be. 
Table 1 indicates that attitudes towards Muslims are the most negative; only 40% of 
people would accept them as a relative through marriage, while the largest change in 
attitudes has been in relation to the ‘other’ ethnic group, followed by Eastern Europeans. 
Views of Muslims have changed little in the last three years, whereas changes in attitudes 
towards the other two groups have been more marked. The table also reveals that 
respondents are more accepting of ethnic minorities when they are at a further social 
distance. This holds for all three groups although the difference is greatest for Muslims, 
with a 40% fall between accepting them as a tourist and accepting them as a relative. 
This provides support for the premise underpinning this paper, that attitudes towards 
ethnic minorities are not homogenous. Levels, patterns, and trends in prejudice vary and 
so it is likely that the determinants of prejudice will also vary. 
 
Table 1. Changing willingness to accept different groups in Northern Ireland in 2010 and 2013 (n). 
 Tourist Resident of NI Resident of local area Colleague Close friend Relative 
Eastern European 2010 98% 83% 83% 88% 77% 76% 
 (1089) (923) (921) (975) (858) (842) 
 2013 88% 79% 73% 69% 57% 53% 
 (1000) (892) (825) (788) (651) (600) 
 % change −9% −4% −10% −18% −20% −23% 
Muslim 2010 87% 72% 68% 72% 61% 51% 
 (982) (822) (776) (821) (694) (583) 
 2013 80% 70% 63% 60% 50% 40% 
 (913) (795) (715) (683) (566) (458) 
 % change −7% −3% −6% −13% −12% −11% 
Other ethnic group 2010 99% 92% 90% 91% 83% 79% 
 (1123) (1046) (1029) (1034) (947) (894) 
 2013 89% 85% 80% 73% 59% 54% 
 (1027) (977) (915) (835) (683) (625) 
 % change −10% −7% −11% −18% −24% −25% 
 
 
Independent variables 
Age and gender are included in the models as controls. Respondents are relatively equally 
divided by gender, with males making up 46% and females 54% of the sample, reﬂecting 
the Census data. The remaining independent variables have been chosen to be as 
consistent as possible with Hayes and Dowds’ (2006) and Knox’s (2010) research to allow 
for continuity in the literature and comparisons with newer data while taking account of 
improvements to the survey questions. The two blocks of independent variables from 
Hayes and Dowds’ (2006); social contact hypothesis and economic self- interest theory 
are both included and variables for the theory of McVeigh and others (Brewer 1992; 
McVeigh 1998a; McVeigh and Rolston 2007) positing a link between sectarianism and 
racism have been included. 
The social contact hypothesis is tested using a measure of the level of contact the 
respondent has with people from each of the three groups. The question asks ‘How often 
do you have contact with Eastern Europeans/Muslims/Other ethnic group?’. This set of 
questions makes it possible to study the effect of contact with each ethnic group directly. 
Among the three groups, respondents state that they have the most contact with 
Eastern Europeans, with 18.6% stating they have daily contact and 10.9% stating they 
have never had contact (Table 2). 48.7% of respondents report that they had never had 
contact with a Muslim and only 3.2% have daily contact. 10% report never having contact 
with someone from the other ethnic group, while 11% report that they have daily 
contact. 
The second hypothesis, linking sectarianism and racism, is tested by asking whether 
individuals are in favour of more religious mixing in marriages, taking into account their 
respondent’s religion (Catholic or Protestant). This is asked as part of a selection of 
questions on sectarian attitudes. As noted above, the respondent’s opposition to 
marriages between Catholics and Protestants, when traditionally mixed marriages have 
not been the norm, is considered an indicator of religious prejudice, and thus 
sectarianism. 
Economic self-interest is operationalised using three variables; social class, education, 
and subjective household income. Social class is measured by Goldthorpe’s (1987, 39–
42) social class schema using 3 occupational classes8 (Social Class (SC) 1 Higher 
managerial, administrative, and professional occupations; SC2 Intermediate 
occupations; SC3 Routine and Manual occupations; reference category never worked 
and long-term unemployed, hereafter referred to as SC4). The majority of respondents 
are employed in the routine and manual occupations (38.8%), while those working in the 
higher managerial, administrative, and professional occupations and intermediate 
occupations make up 28.4% and 24.4% of the sample, respectively, only 8.4% of 
respondents have never worked or are long-term unemployed. Education has been 
recoded into three variables (Higher education, degree or higher; A levels, GCSEs or 
Table 2. Frequency of contact with ethnic groups  NILT 2013.  
  Contact   
Ethnic group Never Very rarely 1–2 times per month 1–2 times per week Daily 
Eastern Europeans 10.9% 26.8% 21.3% 22.4% 18.6% 
(123) (301) (240) (251) (208) 
Muslims 48.7% 35.3% 6.7% 6.1% 3.2% 
(540) (391) (75) (67) (36) 
Other ethnic group 10.0% 27.6% 26.1% 25.4% 11% 
(114) (315) (299) (290) (125) 
Note: n is in parentheses.     
equivalent; reference category no qualiﬁcation). Household income is measured using 
the respondent’s subjective view of their household earnings over the last year and 
whether or not it has fallen or exceeded/ kept up with prices. Measures of how 
ﬁnancially secure or not a person feels is more likely to affect their attitudes to economic 
threats than their real household income. 
The characteristics of the sample are shown in Table 3 below; this includes the frequency 
of respondents for each variable used in the analysis. 
 
 
Table 3. Characteristics of the sample from the NILT 2013. 
 
Block Variable
 n 
Gender Male 532 
Female 618 
Social Contact  
Eastern European Not at all 123 
Very rarely 301 
1–2 times a month 240 
1–2 times a week 251 
Daily 208 
Muslim Not at all 125 
Very rarely 391 
1–2 times a month 75 
1–2 times a week 67 
Daily 36 
Other Not at all 540 
Very rarely 114 
1–2 times a month 315 
1–2 times a week 299 
Daily 290 
Sectarianism Protestant 463 
Catholic 488 
No or other religion 199 
In favour of mixed marriages 837 
Keep as it is/against more mixing 255 
Economic self-interest Never worked/long term unemployed 114 
Routine/manual 430 
Intermediate 282 
Managerial 305 
No qualiﬁcations 248 
GCSE/A Level 525 
Degree or higher 338 
Household income keeping up with prices 374 
Household income not keeping up with prices 742 
 
Hypotheses 
Three hypotheses will be tested in this paper, derived directly from three theories 
described above, and embedded in the existing literature on prejudice. It is hypothesised 
that the results will differ with respect to the three minority groups. The three 
hypotheses are as follows: 
(1) Those who have more contact with individuals from ethnic minorities will be less 
prejudiced against them (social contact hypothesis) (Hayes and Dowds 2006); 
(2) Those who are less accepting of mixed marriages will be more prejudiced against 
ethnic minorities (sectarianism as racism), with religion included as a control (Brewer 
1992; McVeigh and Rolston 2007; Knox 2010); 
(3) Those whose economic situation is most precarious, such as those who are 
unemployed, and those who are disappointed in their economic situation will be more 
prejudiced (economic self-interest) (Hayes and Dowds 2006). 
It is important to reiterate that this study cannot directly compare the explanatory power 
of these three theories, given the use of proxy variables to capture their core elements, but 
instead seeks to ascertain the extent of prejudice against three minority groups, the extent 
to which widely used theories can offer insights into the reasons for any prejudice, and 
how this may vary among the minority groups. The three hypotheses are tested using 
linear regression, repeated for each of the three ethnic minority groups appearing in the 
NILT survey, with variables corresponding to each hypothesis being added in blocks 
following adjustment for socio-demographic factors (Table 4). The table reports 
constants, unstandardised and standardised coefﬁcients, as well as the signiﬁcance level 
for each association and the number of observations. The last of these varies because 
of differences in non-response among variables, which was especially high for the 
question on attitude to mixed marriage. To recall, the parameters reported can be used 
to assess the impact of changes in the variables. Thus, after adjustment for age and sex, 
someone with no contact with Eastern Europeans will score 4.983 on the Social Distance 
Scale, equivalent to accepting them as a resident of the local area but not quite as a 
colleague, whereas someone with daily contact would score 4.983 + 1.739 = 6.632, 
indicating acceptance as somewhere between a close friend and relative. 
A further linear regression was undertaken, including all of the variables from the three 
blocks (Table 5). A logistic regression was also undertaken (not shown), dichotomising 
the social distance scale into acceptance into the family and all the rest, as was done by 
Knox (2010). The directions of associations were the same, although the signiﬁcance 
varied. However, the use of the entire scale conveys the full range of circumstances in 
which there is acceptance of a person from the minority group, thus maximising the 
information provided. Finally, some sub-analyses were undertaken to explore whether 
the observed associations were consistent within different groups in the population. 
 Table 4. Multiple linear regression results for the social distance scale; Eastern European, Muslim, and Other ethnic group 
(entered in blocks, each adjusted for gender and age). 
 Eastern European  Muslim   Other  
Block Variable B Beta  B Beta  B Beta 
Social contact Never (reference) [123]  [539]   [114]  
 Very rarely 0.918 (.255)*** 0.197  1.255 (.167)*** 0.253  0.830 (.251)** 0.194 
  [300]  [389]   [315]  
 1–2 times a month 0.863 (.275)** 0.171  1.685 (.260)*** 0.177  0.792 (.258)** 0.182 
  [238]  [74]   [298]  
 1–2 times a week 1.222 (.265)*** 0.247  1.521 (.281)*** 0.153  1.186 (.258)*** 0.270 
  [251]  [66]   [290]  
 Daily 1.739 (.260)*** 0.328  1.382 (.433)** 0.103  1.503 (.284)*** 0.246 
  [109]  [36]   [125]  
Constant  4.893  5.220   5.162  
N  1211  1104   1142  
Adjusted r2  0.072  0.142   0.063  
Sectarianism Protestant (reference) [436]  [435]   [454]  
Religion Catholic 0.692 (.148)*** 0.170  0.904 (.168)*** 0.193  0.591 (.136)*** 0.157 
  [450]  [451]   [440]  
Mixed Marriages Supports (reference) [657]  [655]   [661]  
 Opposed 0.497 (.179)** 0.106  0.874 (.193)*** 0.162  0.537 (.164)** 0.124 
  [229]  [231]   [233]  
Constant  5.472  5.045   5.694  
N  886  886   894  
Adjusted r2  0.076  0.147   0.083  
Economic self-interest Never worked/long [108]  [106]   [108]  
 term unemployed        
 Routine/manual 1.279 (.282)*** 0.302  0.796 (.291)** 0.165  1.237 (.256)*** 0.316 
  [410]  [413]   [415]  
 Intermediate 1.293 (.301)*** 0.269  0.966 (.313)** 0.176  1.214 (.272)*** 0.272 
  [263]  [266]   [268]  
 Managerial 1.193 (.311)*** 0.257  1.004 (.319)** 0.190  1.185 (.280)*** 0.276 
  [275]  [277]   [279]  
Education No qualiﬁcation [273]  [276]   [277]  
 GCSE/A Level 0.644 (.203)** 0.155  0.569 (.229)* 0.122  0.596 (.193)** 0.155 
  [469]  [471]   [476]  
 Degree or higher 1.191 (.252)*** 0.266  1.300 (.280)*** 0.254  1.222 (.231)** 0.294 
  [314]  [315]   [317]  
Household income Fallen behind [694]  [699]   [703]  
and prices         
 Kept up −0.288 (.137)* −0.065  −0.133 (.155) −0.027  −0.146 (.121) −0.036 
  [362]  [363]   [367]  
Constant  3.93  4.297   4.185  
N  1056  1062   1070  
Adjusted r2  0.099  0.099   0.117  
Note: Standard error in parentheses and N in square brackets. All models signiﬁcant at p < .001. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
 
Table 5. Multiple linear regression results for the social distance scale; Eastern European, Muslim, and Other ethnic group (fully adjusted model). 
 Eastern European  Muslim   Other   
Block Variable Ref B Beta  B Beta  B Beta 
Demographic Gender Male 0.008 (.145) 0.002  −0.073 (.153) −0.016  −0.031 (.125) −0.008  
 Age  −0.000 (.004) −0.003  −0.017 (.005)*** −0.129  −0.001 .004) −0.010  
Social contact Daily Never 1.166 (.259)*** 0.217  1.416 (.501)** 0.092  1.153 (.278)*** 0.180  
 1–2 times a week Never 0.743 (.246)** 0.152  1.049 (.339)** 0.102  0.892 (.23)*** 0.201  
 1–2 times a month Never 0.265 (.245) 0.054  0.963 (.329)** 0.096  0.406 (.222) 0.094  
 Very rarely Never 0.651 (.228)** 0.146  0.866 (.166)*** 0.177  0.629 (.213)** 0.151  
Sectarianism Religion Catholic Protestant 0.68 (.134)*** 0.169  0.912 (.152)*** 0.195  0.598 (.125)*** 0.158  
 Mixed Marriages supports Opposed 0.416 (.152)** 0.090  0.703 (.171)*** 0.132  0.364 (.141)* 0.084  
Economic self-interest Social Class 1 Long term unemployed 0.831 (.141)** 0.186  0.376 (.326) 0.072  0.897 (.265)** 0.214  
 Social Class 2 Long term unemployed 0.935 (.286)** 0.199  0.444 (.314) 0.081  0.965 (.256)*** 0.218  
 Social Class 3 Long term unemployed 1.009 (.276)*** 0.245  0.186 (.292) 0.039  1.022 (.237)*** 0.264  
 Degree or higher No Qualiﬁcations 1.142 (.256)*** 0.261  0.891 (.267)** 0.174  1.088 (.221)*** 0.264  
 GCSE/A Level No Qualiﬁcations 0.628 (.239)** 0.156  0.489 (.207)* 0.104  0.524 (.172)** 0.138  
 Household income Fallen behind prices −0.343 (.186)* −0.081  −0.141 (.158) −0.028  −0.142 (.13) −0.035  
Constant 5.226 5.439 5.052 
Adjusted r2 0.158 0.207 0.161 
N 830 813 840 
F p < .0001 p<0.0001 p < .0001 
Note: Standard error in parentheses and N in square brackets. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
   
 
 
 
 
 Results 
Eastern Europeans 
More frequent social contact is signiﬁcantly associated with greater acceptance, with 
those having the most social contact almost two points higher on the Social Distance 
Scale (Table 4), and a generally progressive increase as contact increases. Although 
somewhat attenuated, the association remains signiﬁcant in the fully adjusted model 
(Table 5). However, while a stratiﬁed analysis (Table 6) shows that this association is 
similar among the two highest and lowest social classes, it is only seen among Protestants 
who, overall, are much less accepting of Eastern Europeans. Further analyses (data not 
shown) show that, even in the top two social classes, Catholics with daily contact with 
Eastern Europeans are more accepting of them than Protestants, with a difference of 
almost half a point on the Social Distance Scale. Thus, the data support the social contact 
theory among Protestants but not Catholics. 
Turning to sectarianism as racism, those who favour mixed marriages are more accepting 
of Eastern Europeans but the coefﬁcient is about half that seen with social contact. The 
association remains signiﬁcant in the fully adjusted model. In a stratiﬁed analysis (data 
not shown) the association is similar among Protestants and Catholics (B = 0.445 and 
0.570, respectively), although the constant (i.e. the underlying level of acceptance) was 
lower among Protestants at 5.570 compared to 6.039. Economic self-interest is also 
associated with acceptance. Having either GCSE/A-level qualiﬁcations or a degree is 
signiﬁcantly associated with greater acceptance than having no qualiﬁcations. It is 
important to note that those with no qualiﬁcations are not a trivial proportion of the 
population; in this sample they comprise 22% of all respondents, although with most 
among the over 55s (77%). 
 
Table 6. Multiple linear regression results for social contact and the social distance scale; Eastern European group, divided 
by social class and religion (all models adjusted for age and gender). 
 Reference  
Block Variable  B Beta B Beta 
   Social Class 1 & 2  Social Class 3 & 4  
 Never  [52]  [91]  
Social contact Very rarely Never 1.464 (.403)*** 0.314 0.492 (.331) 0.107 
   [133]  [178]  
 1–2 times a month Never 1.184 (.415)** 0.263 0.399 (.385) 0.071 
   [138]  [97]  
 1–2 times a week Never 1.499 (.407)*** 0.335 0.845 (.368)* 0.157 
   [145]  [100]  
 Daily Never 1.964 (.397)*** 0.416 1.434 (.365)*** 0.241 
   [108]  [67]  
Constant   4.891  4.901  
Adjusted r2   0.080  0.063  
N   576  533  
   Protestant  Catholic  
 Never  [82]  [43]  
 Very rarely Never 1.091 (.346)** 0.224 0.285 (.361) 0.072 
   [139]  [128]  
Social contact 1–2 times a month Never 1.343 (.371)*** 0.245 −0.240 (.410) −0.056 
   [97]  [98]  
 1–2 times a week Never 1.77 (.367)*** 0.322 0.499 (.391) 0.012 
   [89]  [105]  
 Daily Never 2.318 (.356)*** 0.403 0.522 (.386) 0.115 
   [70]  [74]  
Constant   3.899  6.419  
Adjusted r2   0.117  0.044  
N   448  448  
Note: Standard error in parentheses and reference categories in italics. All models signiﬁcant at p < .001. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001. 
 However, as age is controlled for in the regression, having no qualiﬁcations is 
independently associated with prejudice. Social class is also signiﬁcantly associated with 
prejudice, although in the opposite direction to what might be expected; those in the 
highest social class, higher managerial, administrative, and professional occupations, 
report higher levels of prejudice against Eastern Europeans than those in lower routine 
and manual occupations. However, being long-term unemployed or having never 
worked is associated with less acceptance than is seen with any of the other three social 
class variables. Perhaps surprisingly, those that feel their income has kept up with or 
exceeded prices in the last year are more prejudiced against Eastern Europeans than 
those who feel their household income has fallen behind prices. 
In the fully adjusted model, there is support for all three theories (subject to the caveat 
about social contact and religion noted above), but with social contact and economic 
self-interest more important than sectarianism. 
 
Muslims 
The second model in Tables 4 and 5 shows those variables that predict levels of prejudice 
against Muslims, again as measured by the Social Distance Scale. In the fully adjusted 
model (and in each of the models entering each block separately) gender is not 
signiﬁcant, in contrast to attitudes towards Eastern Europeans, but age is. Additionally, 
Table 5 shows that age has a somewhat stronger association with prejudice than with the 
other groups, with older people more likely to be prejudiced against Muslims. In this case, 
the results need to be interpreted with some care as over half of the sample has no 
contact at all with Muslims. Once again, there is a signiﬁcant association with social 
contact but when the model only includes the age and gender adjusted social contact 
block, there is no obvious gradient. This would suggest that having any contact at all 
increases the level of acceptance, with little gain after that. However, in the fully 
adjusted model, there is more evidence of a gradient. Once again, a stratiﬁed analysis by 
social class and religion was undertaken (Table 7). The patterns were consistent in the 
highest and lowest social class categories, as was seen with the Eastern Europeans, but 
in contrast more frequent contact was associated with greater acceptance by both 
Catholics as well as Protestants. 
Turning to the variables associated with sectarianism, there was again a signiﬁcant 
association with supporting mixed marriages, and the coefﬁcient was larger than with 
Eastern Europeans. Once again, Catholics were more accepting. These associations 
remained in the fully adjusted model. Turning to economic self-interest, signiﬁcant 
associations with the variables were again seen, although the coefﬁcients tended to 
be smaller than with Eastern Europeans. However, most of the associations were 
attenuated to below statistical signiﬁcance in the fully adjusted model. 
 
‘Other’ ethnic group 
The ﬁnal model in Tables 4 and 5 report the results for respondents’ prejudice against 
‘other ethnic groups for example Chinese or Asian’. Once again there is support for the 
social contact hypothesis, although again the coefﬁcients are somewhat smaller than 
with Eastern Europeans. A stratiﬁed analysis (not shown) is rather similar to that seen 
with Eastern Europeans. Thus, among Catholics, compared with no contact, those with 
contact rarely, one to two times per month or daily are not signiﬁcantly more accepting, 
although those with contact one to two times per week are (p = .027). 
 Discussion 
The starting point of this study was the evidence, primarily from the media and non-
governmental organisations, of growing numbers of racially motivated attacks on ethnic 
minorities, coupled with the limited amount of existing research on individual 
determinants of prejudice in Northern Ireland. This paper draws on earlier work but 
updates it to take account of a very different demographic and political situation, using 
a new, extended and larger data set, looking at three different groups of minorities and 
employing the widely used Social Distance Scale. 
Three hypotheses were proposed and the ﬁndings provide some support for all three. 
However, before reviewing the theories, it is important to note that, in the fully adjusted 
model, age only has an impact on attitudes towards Muslims, with older people 
signiﬁcantly more likely to reject a Muslim person at a closer social distance to them. 
The ﬁnding that that this does not hold for the two other groups, alongside other 
results that differ for the three groups provides empirical support for the argument 
that determinants of prejudice against various ethnic groups are likely to be different. 
Support for the social contact hypothesis is only partial. Although, overall, those with 
more contact with each of the three groups are more accepting of them, this does not 
apply to Catholics coming into contact with Eastern Europeans or the Other group, a 
ﬁnding that seems to reﬂect the relatively high level of acceptance of these groups even 
among Catholics who have little or no contact with them. The ﬁndings are encouraging 
for each of these groups, but especially so for Eastern Europeans, of whom there are over 
35,000 in Northern Ireland. The opportunities for contact with Muslims are, however, 
much less as they number approximately two in every thousand of the total population, 
substantially limiting their opportunities for contact. This is reﬂected in the high number 
of respondents reporting no contact at all. 
The ﬁndings also offer partial support for the sectarianism hypothesis, with those most 
accepting of mixed marriages more willing to accept all three groups, although the effect 
was largest with Muslims and, in general, the coefﬁcients were somewhat smaller than 
with social contact or economic self-interest. This indicates the need for future research 
on community relations to include, at the very least, a discussion of racism alongside 
sectarianism. These ﬁndings are consistent with those of Pehrson, Gheorghiu, and 
Ireland (2012), who found that Protestants were more prejudiced than Catholics but also 
in their ﬁnding that that the greatest difference between them is in relation to attitudes 
towards Muslims (noting that the coefﬁcient for religion in the fully adjusted model here 
was almost one). This may seem surprising as one might expect the difference to be 
greater for Eastern Europeans, the majority of whom that come to Northern Ireland (as 
measured in migration statistics) are from Catholic countries. Thus, for Catholics, Eastern 
Europeans are not completely an out-group and they are likely to have contact with them 
at church, although in some parts of Northern Ireland where these communities are 
highly concentrated separate masses are now being celebrated in Polish and a selection 
of other Eastern Europeans languages (McDermott 2011, 233).  However, what is less 
publicised but very important in Northern Ireland is the way that Protestants and 
Catholics have aligned themselves in relation to the Israeli Palestinian conﬂict 
(Anderman 2012; McBride 2013). Protestants have taken to supporting the Israeli cause 
and Catholics the Palestinian one, with the latter perceiving another community 
discriminated against by a dominant power. Both sides prominently display this 
sentiment by ﬂying ﬂags and painting wall murals, predominantly in Belfast.  While it 
may seem surprising to an outsider, the identiﬁcation with the conﬂict is an important 
part of some people’s Catholic and Protestant identity. This could be an explanation for 
the gulf in the attitudes towards Muslims between Catholics and Protestants. 
 Table 7. Multiple linear regression results for social contact and the social distance scale; Muslim group, divided by social 
class and religion (all models adjusted for age and gender). 
Reference 
Block Variable  B Beta B Beta 
   Social Class 1 & 2  Social Class 3 & 4  
 Never  [242]  [318]  
Social contact Very rarely Never 1.119 (.228)*** 0.241 1.239 (.250)*** 0.238 
   [216]  [156]  
 1–2 times a month Never 1.597 (.289)*** 0.198 1.264 (.540)* 0.109 
   [47]  [25]  
 1–2 times a week Never 1.007 (.380)** 0.114 2.057 (.396)*** 0.185 
   [38]  [21]  
 Daily Never 1.552 (.367)*** 0.129 0.828 (.834) 0.055 
   [20]  [10]  
Constant   5.872  4.631  
Adjusted r2   0.141  0.141  
N   563  530  
   Protestant  Catholic  
 Never  [255]  [228]  
 Very rarely Never 1.433 (.247)*** 0.286 0.876 (.251)** 0.193 
   [157]  [142]  
Social contact 1–2 times a month Never 1.619 (.451)*** 0.156 1.230 (.335)*** 0.129 
   [25]  [27]  
 1–2 times a week Never 1.592 (.510)** 0.161 1.077 (.380)** 0.113 
   [27]  [22]  
 Daily Never 1.912 (.644)** 0.135 1.819 (.268)*** 0.140 
   [12]  [11]  
Constant   4.277  61.39  
Adjusted r2   0.142  0.139  
N   476  430  
Note: Standard error in parentheses and reference categories in italics. All models signiﬁcant at p < .001. 
*p < .05. 
**p < .01. 
***p < .001. 
 
The results in relation to economic self-interest reveal that economic determinants have 
little effect on prejudice against Muslims, which in the model is mainly driven by age, 
religion, and   low levels of contact. This difference may reﬂect how few Muslims who 
have migrated to Northern Ireland compete for low-skilled jobs. As The Economist noted 
‘Many of the 4,000 or so Muslims who live permanently in Ulster are doctors, academics, 
entrepreneurs and property developers. Only in the past few years have they been joined 
by a poorer group of asylum-seekers from Somalia’ (‘On the Other Foot’, 2014, 1). With 
Eastern Europeans, those in a more precarious position are less accepting. Education to 
degree level or higher is signiﬁcantly associated with greater acceptance of all ethnic 
groups, although less so in relation to Muslims. 
The most important ﬁnding from this analysis is, however, that while there are a number 
of similarities, there are also some important differences in the strength of the 
explanatory factors for the three different minority groups. The need for a nuanced 
approach to race relations applies more generally to the UK, given the diversity of ethnic 
minority groups in many places, but it is especially important in Northern Ireland because 
of its unique experience with migration, with two relatively distinct stages. Members of 
the ‘other’ ethnic minority groups are more likely to be accepted at all levels of social 
distance than Eastern Europeans. This could be because of the ambiguity of the ethnic 
minority in question or because this group is seen as constituting primarily Chinese and 
 South Asians, who comprise the majority of long-term migrants in Northern Ireland. 
These ﬁndings have potential implications for the Stormont government. First, within a 
framework of anti-discrimination policies, the experiences of each minority group should 
be considered separately. Second, policies should also address speciﬁcally the greater 
levels of prejudice in the Protestant community. Third, there may be beneﬁts from 
community initiatives that bring people together with the aim of initiating contact and 
breaking down barriers between the different communities, although subject to 
empirical evaluation. Finally, there are implications for the NILT survey. While it is 
important to ensure continuity between waves, there is an argument that the three 
categories of ethnic group needs further reﬁnement. In particular, there may be 
confusion between the Muslim group and the Other, which consists of Asians, some of 
whom are also Muslim. In addition, while respecting the need for conﬁdentiality, the 
survey could usefully add geocoded variables, even if only to the level of local 
government area, as census data show differences in where people born outside of the 
UK and Northern Ireland are settling. Geocoding would enable linkage with other routine 
data, facilitating multilevel analysis. However, this does not detract from the excellent 
work by ARK in conducting the survey and providing the data in such good condition for 
the use of researchers and others. 
 
Finally, having tested three distinct theories taken from the existing literature it is clear 
that there is still considerable unexplained variation in attitudes. This calls for further 
research, especially if improved survey data are to be collected. With rising numbers of 
ethnic minorities, whether arriving in Northern Ireland or being born in the region, future 
research will be needed to track changing perceptions of ethnic groups, both to place 
this issue higher on the policy agenda and to track progress over time, just as has been 
done with sectarianism. 
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Notes 
1. The 2011 Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency Census ﬁgures on reported religion and 
religion brought up in http://www.nisra.gov.uk/census/key_press_release_2011.pdf. 
2. The Census reports only 84 individuals born in Eastern Europe as Muslim (0.25%). While the 
categories in the survey are not mutually exclusive in practice this is very unlikely to be a problem. 
3. Mann–Whitney U-test 
p = .002. 4. p = .121. 
5. p = .785. 
6. 1.97% of the usually resident population. www.nisra.gov.uk/archive/census/2011/results/key-
statistics/summary- report.pdf. 
7. This data can be accessed at www.nisra.gov.uk/census/2011_results.html. 
8. Social Class was condensed into the 3 class schema rather than 5 because of the small n of respondents. 
Lower supervisory and technical occupations included only 67 respondents, while higher managerial, 
administrative,  and professional occupations included 318. 
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